Capital Arrives at the Top

The two biggest years on record for US commercial real estate deals were 2021 and 2022.¹

Four years on, values are still about 13% below that peak, and office is down by a third.²

Most capital lands at the top of the cycle, private capital and family offices pay for it.

Everyone who invested at that top can defend it: the returns said yes.

Everyone sitting out now can defend that too: the debt doesn't pencil.

Both are wrong for the same reason. They are looking at what happened, not at what comes next.

Record volumes are a trailing indicator.
So is consensus.
So are cranes on the skyline, resort pipelines and soaring prices.

They are the last signals, not the first, and they are already in the price. The returns are real, but they belong to capital committed years earlier.

Velocity, volume and costs all peak together. Risk looks lowest exactly when it is highest, right before the fundamentals crack.

Then the mirror: nothing is moving, the numbers look their worst, and risk looks highest exactly when it is lowest.

None of this is new. It has been first-year material in commercial real estate and Ivy League MBA programs for three decades.

And yet the industry ignores its own textbook, for three reasons.

A Belief, a Mandate, a Boss

The first is belief.

Investor surveys show that expected returns peak right after past returns do, and inflows peak with them.³ Those are the moments that deliver the least. When every metric is at its best, the odds of further upside are at their lowest and the cost of being wrong is at its highest.

The second is the mandate.

Funds raise the most right after the best years, because that is when investors want in. The mandate then forces the money out quickly, while the numbers still look pristine, because investors dislike paying fees on idle capital. By the time prices break and sellers are forced, the fund is fully invested. It is deployed at the top and locked out of the bottom, by design. Last cycle, funds from the 2004 to 2007 vintages returned far less than those raised from 2009 to 2013, which delivered median net IRRs of around 15%.⁴

The third is career risk.

Keynes wrote that it is "better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally."⁵ Lose with everyone and it was the market. Win alone and it was luck. Lose alone and it was you. Managers behave exactly that way.⁶ And being early looks exactly like being wrong, for as long as it takes to be proven right.

None of this is stupid.

It is rational for the manager and paid for by the family. But read the three again: a belief, a mandate, a boss. Outside a fund, only the first remains, and a belief can change. Family capital is built to buy the bottom.

Behind the 20% IRR

A 20% IRR sounds impressive until you ask what sits behind it.

  • What is the base-case hold period, and how fragile is it?

  • What is the path to exit, who needs to be buying, and will they share today's sentiment?

  • How much of the return is leverage?

  • What happens if the market moves sideways for 18 months?

  • How much construction or entitlement risk is buried in the model?

  • What happens if it exits and there is nothing worth rolling into for a few years?

For every glossy 20% success, there is a graveyard of “almosts”, write-downs, outright losses and capital that can’t get out.

Permits stalled. Timelines slipped. Targets missed. Paper returns that never met reality.

The evidence sits on bank balance sheets. The New York Fed found weakly capitalized banks extending maturities and granting payment relief to distressed borrowers to preserve their own capital, which has increased the stock of commercial mortgages coming due.⁷

With exits less reliable and fewer good places to redeploy, the odds of actually realizing 20% are lower than the model shows.

And even when a deal delivers, what happens next matters as much, because idle capital between exits quietly rewrites the IRR.

The only valid way to compare returns is risk-adjusted. Most pitches leave that out and lead with the headline number.

Deals with lower headline returns often end up ahead, for three reasons:

  • Their returns come from income, not a projected exit.

  • They are underwritten to hold through a downturn, not to sell before one.

  • And they are held long enough for that income to compound.

A lower return you actually realize beats a higher one that stays on paper.

Debt distorts the picture in both directions. In 2021, cheap debt made weak assets pencil. Today, expensive debt makes strong assets look as if they don't.

Rates move the price, not the income.

An unlevered yield on real fundamentals does not change with the cost of debt.

The Bottom Line

Most capital buys the top because it has to. Private and family capital does not. It can buy when the numbers look worst.

Debt is financial engineering, not a fundamental. If the asset earns its yield without it, the deal works.

Debt can be added later. The price you paid cannot be changed. And by the time debt is cheap, every model works and prices have risen to match.

Wait for the debt to pencil well, and you pay for the top again.

Here is what the yield looks like in luxury Single Family Leisure: The SFL Asymmetry


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Jack Laurier is a disciplined asset management firm for luxury Single Family Leisure (SFL) real estate. We source, underwrite, and steward rare vacation homes in irreplaceable markets as trophy hospitality assets for investors and family offices.

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1.2.3.4.5.6.7. Select Research Referenced: MSCI Real Assets (2023), Green Street (2026), Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), Preqin (2016), Keynes (1936), Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2024).